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Managing the ﬂows of gas and rules: Ukraine between the EU and
Russia
Kataryna Wolczuk*
Centre for Russian, European and Eurasian Studies, School of Government and Society,
University of Birmingham, Muirhead Tower, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK
(Received 21 September 2015; accepted 30 March 2016)
The article explores the impact of the EU and Russia on domestic change in the gas
sector in Ukraine. It seeks to identify the barriers to, and triggers for, Ukraine’s
alignment with EU rules against the backdrop of Ukraine’s energy dependence on
Russia by focusing on the institutionalization of energy relations. By studying the
whole post-Soviet period, this article provides a comprehensive overview of the
interplay of domestic and external factors shapin the energy sector in Ukraine and
illuminates the often paradoxical effects of external inﬂuences on domestic actors’
preferences and strategies. We argue that EU inﬂuence was ineffective in overcoming
domestic barriers to reforms and that it was Russia’s coercive actions that have led
to the adoption of EU rules by Ukraine, despite powerful domestic vested interests
and the weaknesses in EU’s policy.
Keywords: Ukraine; Russia; European Neighborhood Policy; energy; Energy
Community; gas market; interdependence
Introduction
The energy sectors in the countries in the post-Soviet states in Europe are characterized
by simultaneous ﬂows of energy resources and rules: Russia exports hydrocarbons
whereas the European Union (EU) promotes regulatory frameworks. Russia’s inﬂuence
in the so-called ‘near abroad’ is greatly facilitated through asymmetric energy interde-
pendence. In turn, while being energy-poor itself, the EU endeavors to export ‘good
governance’ to the post-Soviet countries participating in the European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (namely Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus,
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine). Therefore, the post-Soviet countries located within
Europe (hereafter ‘the neighboring countries’; not including the three Baltic states,
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which are EU members) are simultaneously subjected to
the inﬂuence of both the EU and Russia.
These ﬂows reﬂect diverse and mostly competing objectives of the EU and Russia.
Russia’s interest lies in perpetuating these countries’ energy dependence on it, not only
because of the revenues from exports but also because of the political leverage this
provides over those countries. While promoting security of supplies, the EU promotes
diversiﬁcation, market principles, and energy efﬁciency, which would lower their
dependence on Russia and thereby circumscribe the inﬂuence of Russia.
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The recipients are – with the exception of Azerbaijan – energy-poor. Moreover, their
asymmetric energy interdependence with Russia is compounded by a pipeline network
and location of reﬁneries that is completely structured around supplies from Russia.
However, the neighboring states have handled this legacy in very different ways, which
is worthy of analysis for two reasons. First, energy has been a pivotal indicator of these
countries’ economic and political trajectory since the collapse of the USSR (Von Hirsch-
hausen and Waelde 2001). Reforms in the energy sector (and the readiness to incur
related political and economic costs) have been a strong indicator of the overall will
and capacity to carry out domestic reforms writ large. Second, energy interdependence
has had a profound effect on the foreign policies of the post-Soviet countries, both for
energy exporters or importers.
Understanding developments in the energy sector requires an examination of both
domestic and regional dynamics, and involves a plethora of domestic and international
actors with a complex mix of motives. This internal–external nexus is particularly well
illustrated in the case of Ukraine. Nominally, Ukraine’s strategic interests in the energy
sector coincide with those of the EU and are essentially focused on minimizing the neg-
ative political and economic consequences of being an energy-poor state (Razumkov
Centre 2012, 35).1 Yet, notwithstanding political declarations and legal obligations, the
political elites failed to restructure the energy sector by adopting EU rules until 2014
(when dependency on Russia became securitized).
The ruling elites, which have been closely intertwined with the business interests of
the so-called oligarchs, have had multi-layered and even contradictory preferences with
regard to Russia and the EU. They have favored economic integration with the EU and
have advocated a path to membership, with no political force openly opposing integra-
tion with the EU (Wolczuk 2008). At the same time, the Ukrainian elites repeatedly
eschewed offers of closer economic integration with Russia, preferring instead to coop-
erate within the loose framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS),
despite Ukraine’s highly asymmetric interdependence with Russia and the latter’s use of
energy dependency to achieve its own political goals vis-à-vis Ukraine (Dragneva and
Wolczuk 2015). Yet, curiously, Ukraine did little to wean itself off its gas dependence
on Russia and did not reform the energy sector in order to reduce Russia’s leverage over
Ukraine.
This article seeks to explain this puzzle by examining the role of Russia and the EU
in shaping the energy sector and the receptivity of the domestic actors in Ukraine to
these external inﬂuences. It is argued that Ukrainian authorities failed to reform the
energy sector in line with EU stipulations because the sector generated massive rents for
the ruling elites. The elites acted as powerful gatekeepers, responding to external inﬂu-
ences to maximize beneﬁts and minimize constraints (Gnedina 2015; Tolstrup 2014).
We explore and explain the mixed pattern of resistance and openness to the EU’s export
of rules against the backdrop of Ukraine’s energy dependence on Russia. Up to now,
these two vectors tended to be analyzed separately. These parallel investigations are
hardly surprising, given the complex and very distinct nature of EU–Ukraine and
Ukraine–Russia energy relations. Our aim is to bring the two strands of relations
together and focus on the pattern of institutionalization and legalization of relations in
order to identify the barriers and triggers for Ukraine’s alignment with EU rules.
This article illuminates the often paradoxical effects of external actors on domestic
change. The shifting patterns of inﬂuence can be broadly divided into three distinct peri-
ods. During 1991–2004, Russia was a dominant external actor, which provided powerful
incentives for eschewing reforms – rents accruing from gas trade with Russia emerged
2 K. Wolczuk
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at the heart of the political system in Ukraine. At the time, the costs and risks of
non-reforms and ‘addiction to cheap gas’ were not (yet) apparent. During this period
the EU was weakly engaged with Ukraine. Between 2005 and 2013, however, the con-
text changed dramatically – Russia steeply raised gas prices and explicitly linked their
reduction to Ukraine’s participation in the Russia-led integration regimes. Having failed
to reform the energy sector, Ukraine was increasingly vulnerable to the Russian issue
linkage. This predicament prompted an unexpected turn to the EU to fend off Russian
demands (Guzizullin and Lozovyy 2011). President Yanukovych made far-reaching
commitments to integrate Ukraine into the EU energy market. Yet still the elites
eschewed their domestic commitments. The third period – from 2014 onward – is
marked by a radical cutting off of ties with Russia, with Ukraine ﬁnally starting to
reform the energy sector. Our analysis indicates that, on its own, the EU’s inﬂuence was
ineffective in overcoming domestic barriers to reforms, and it was Russia’s aggression
that ﬁnally prompted Ukraine to align with EU rules.
In conceptual terms, in addition to Keohane and Nye’s framework (2000) as outlined
in the Introduction to this Special Issue, the article relies on Hirschman’s work (1980)
on the utilization of asymmetric economic relations as an instrument of national power.
The Ukraine–Russia energy relationship can be explained by the ‘Hirschman effect’
which stipulates that, ﬁrst, an asymmetric economic relationship between two states
(such as Russia and Ukraine) has political consequences, and secondly, that economic
relations inﬂuence the way in which governments deﬁne their interests, something
which then impacts on foreign policy of the smaller state (1980). Asymmetric trade rela-
tions accrue political beneﬁts to the larger state because it becomes a direct source of
power over smaller states. Thus, as Abdelal and Kirshner (1999, 120) explain,
[I]f large country A trades with small country B, commerce between them might account
for only two or three percent of country A’s exports and imports, but might well represent
over half of country B’s. Such a relationship gives the larger country coercive power over
the smaller, because an interruption of the relationship would cause much greater distress in
B than in A. Threats of interruption, then, both explicit and implicit, give A power.
In essence, with asymmetric economic dependency it is the smaller country that carries
the bulk of the cost of a breakup of such a relationship, while, conversely, powerful
states can exploit economic dependence for their own political ends. Crucially, the
Hirschman effect is not merely caused by asymmetries in economic relationships per se,
but, in particular, by the ways in which this dependence impacts on smaller states’ pref-
erences: one of the key factors of inﬂuence is ‘the strength of the vested interests which
A has created by its trade economics of B’ (Hirschman 1980, 18). Thus, international
economic relations affect domestic politics in smaller states primarily because incentives
offered by the larger state shape the vested interests in the smaller state: ‘[T]he pattern
of economic relations, especially during periods of political transition when national
interests are most malleable, will have a formative inﬂuence on their trajectories’
(Abdelal and Kirshner 1999, 122).
We argue that the way that the Ukrainian elites managed their country’s asymmetric
energy dependence on Russia not only perpetuated this dependence, but, more impor-
tantly, shaped Ukraine’s political and economic trajectories since independence. In
2014, Ukraine took drastic steps to reduce this dependence and resulting vulnerability
but, after two decades of non-reforms, adopting EU’s regulatory framework will be a
difﬁcult and long-drawn process.
Eurasian Geography and Economics 3
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 08
:06
 24
 M
ay
 20
16
 
Energy interdependence and the political economy of the energy sector
(1992–2004)
Ukrainian–Russian energy interdependence
Abundant energy resources underwrote the Soviet economic model and its highly
distributive nature. Energy resources extracted in individual republics served the purpose
of the economic development of the USSR without beneﬁting the energy-rich republics
as such. Ukraine was largely self-sufﬁcient in terms of natural gas in the 1950s, but
within two decades its gas ﬁelds were (prematurely) depleted for the sake of all-Soviet
development, leading the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (UkrSSR) to become
dependent on gas supplies from Russia. At the same time, energy prices were not fac-
tored into production costs, something which favored the development of energy-inten-
sive industries, such as metallurgy and chemicals, and nurtured a wasteful culture of gas
use by households and industries. Across the USSR, including the UkrSSR, resource
abundance resulted in the development of a highly inefﬁcient, energy inefﬁcient eco-
nomic structure (Shabad 1969).
When the republican elites in Ukraine pushed for independence in 1991, little
thought was given to the implications of being an energy-poor state burdened with
highly energy-intensive economic structures. No strategy was developed to reduce
Ukraine’s energy inefﬁciency – among the world’s highest. Ukraine simply relied on a
continuous supply of cheap gas from Russia and continued to subsidize domestic con-
sumers. Even with the low price of gas, at around US$50 per thousand cubic meter
(tcm), Ukraine struggled to pay for gas imports and rapidly accumulated a large debt to
Russia, leading to energy becoming a continuous ‘bone of contention’ in bilateral rela-
tions. The Ukrainian leadership exploited Ukraine’s status as a key transit country for
Russian gas to the European market: 80 percent of Russian gas to the West traversed
Ukraine. As Kyiv believed it unthinkable that Russia would jeopardize supplies to
Western consumers to pressurize Ukraine, this transit status conferred some power to
Ukraine and lowered the asymmetry of energy relations. However, this interdependence
and reliance on Ukraine’s importance to Russia only disinclined the Ukrainian elites to
reform the sector which had fast become central to the political economy of energy
rents (Balmaceda 2013).
Russia’s policy toward Ukraine (1992–2004)
In the 1990s, Russia’s policy toward the ‘near abroad,’ including Ukraine, was rather
inert. This stemmed at least partially from Russia’s perceptions of Ukraine’s separa-
tion from Russia as a temporary phenomenon (Lester 1994). Russia continued to sub-
sidize oil and gas supplies to Ukraine in order ‘to maintain the notion that their
relations are not simply relations between any two states’ (D’Anieri 2002, 45) and
thereby preserve the ‘privileged ties’ between them. This also ensured that diversiﬁca-
tion of supplies was not an economically viable strategy for the newly independent
states (Balmaceda 2013).
However, already at this stage, Russia was not averse to exploiting energy prices
and debt to further its geopolitical preferences. For example, in the early 1990s Russia
made gas prices and/or debt reduction contingent on Ukraine’s compliance on the status
of the Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in Crimea, which allowed Russia to retain military bases
on Ukrainian territory (Wolczuk 2003). By capitalizing on Ukraine’s geopolitical
importance for Russia and making periodic strategic concessions, Ukrainian leaders
4 K. Wolczuk
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were able to procure low gas prices from Russia. Also, Ukraine’s chronic inability to
service its massive energy debt was largely overlooked (Newnham 2011, 138) or man-
aged through various ‘swap schemes’ (Toritsyn and Miller 2002). Ofﬁcially, the Kremlin
kept gas prices frozen at about US$50 per tcm till 2004, with much of the bill reduced
in lieu of transit fees for gas being sent on to Western Europe. This murky pattern of
gas purchases and transit fees allowed elites to extract considerable rents, something
which reduced the incentives for domestic reforms, investment, and diversiﬁcation of
supplies.
Energy relations between Ukraine and Russia were highly politicized and not effec-
tively institutionalized. Russia excluded energy from multilateral legal agreements, pre-
ferring ad hoc arrangements with the dependent states. Symptomatically, energy was
excluded from the 1993 free trade area (FTA) bilateral agreement between Russia and
Ukraine and the 1994 and 1999 CIS FTAs (neither of which were ratiﬁed by Russia, as
it happens). Contracts were negotiated at the highest political level in an ad hoc and
opaque way through secretive negotiations, which involved presidents, prime ministers,
and ofﬁcials from the state-owned companies Gazprom and Naftogaz (Balmaceda
2008). Only the broad contours of the agreements were made public, but it is clear that
in legal terms, these contracts lacked precision in many important respects, such as
mechanisms for dispute resolution, meaning that disagreements required new rounds of
negotiations. Yet this very low degree of institutionalization and high degree of politi-
cization were actually satisfactory to both Kyiv and Moscow. The fact that many legal
and technical issues, such as the location of the metering stations, remained unregulated
provided ample opportunities for diverse interpretations and exploitation both by
Ukraine and Russia. With gas dependency elevated to the top of the political agenda
between the two countries, gas price and energy debt were linked with other nominally
unrelated issues, such as the BSF, border disputes, or Ukraine’s participation in integra-
tion projects (see below).
Ukraine’s management of interdependence (1992–2004)
The interdependence of Ukraine and Russia with regard to supplies and transit was a
legacy of Soviet planning. High interdependence is deemed a key factor affecting the
EU’s rule transfer in the eastern neighborhood (Dimitrova and Dragneva 2009). Con-
versely, high dependence on other external actors is believed to constrain such a trans-
fer. But we argue in the article that the explanatory power of dependence is actually
limited. Most post-Soviet states were dependent on gas supplies from Russia, yet they
adopted vastly different strategies to deal with their energy-poor status as exempliﬁed
by the diverse trajectories of the three Baltic republics and Ukraine in the energy sector.
The key issue is not so much the asymmetric interdependence per se, but how it has
been viewed and managed by the energy-poor states (Balmaceda 2013).
Ukraine’s handling of its energy-poor status was perplexing. It failed to introduce
energy efﬁciency and to diversify its supplies and contracts over two decades. Diversiﬁ-
cation is only possible by adopting longer time horizons and developing a long-term
strategy backed by sufﬁcient investment in infrastructure. And while Ukraine made
some efforts to diversify supplies to import gas from Central Asia, this strategy was
foiled by Russia’s control over the pipelines that delivered Central Asian exports to the
West (Balmaceda 2008). Yet at the same time, Ukraine behaved like an energy-rich state
and kept prices low for domestic consumers – low gas prices were one of the few pub-
lic goods that the elites were able to deliver, albeit nominally (see below). This merely
Eurasian Geography and Economics 5
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entrenched a culture of energy waste and discouraged investment in the energy sector,
including the pursuit of energy efﬁciency and the extraction of remaining domestic gas
reserves (for example, in the Carpathian mountains) and exploration of new ones (in the
Black Sea). The low prices created various anomalies and failings affecting society at
large; for example, state subsidies for municipal heating facilities were very high and
there was little investment in the district heating infrastructure, leading to increasingly
frequent outages at the local level (Mayhew 2010). The costs of artiﬁcially low prices
(for non-industrial consumers) and the high rate of non-payment (by both residential
and industrial users) were borne by society at large (Balmaceda 2013). Because of low
prices, the Ukrainian gas company, Naftogaz, was unable to recover the cost of
imported gas and the company’s debt was shifted to the Ukrainian budget, signiﬁcantly
weakening the condition of public ﬁnances.
Yet low gas prices were critical for Ukraine’s economy, helping it survive the reces-
sion of the 1990s (Mayhew 2010) and then to grow in the next decade, thanks to inter-
national demand for products from its key energy-intensive industries: metallurgy and
chemicals. These two industrial sectors came to dominate Ukrainian exports in the
2000s (Sleptsova 2010), turning Ukraine into the largest consumer of Russian gas in the
world between 2000 and 2006 (see Końonczuk 2015).
Political economy of the energy sector
Von Hirschhausen and Waelde (2001) argue that the energy sector either accelerated or
hindered change in post-communist countries depending on the degree of its politiciza-
tion. Indeed, one of the key common features of the countries in the ‘common neighbor-
hood’ has been the reliance of their political regimes on rents from the energy sector
both in the energy-rich and energy-poor states. This is only too evident in Ukraine,
where oligarchs’ wealth originated in the energy sector in the 1990s (see Balmaceda
2013) and they ended up controlling nearly half of the Ukrainian economy, including
chemical and metallurgical enterprises as well as the regional energy distribution compa-
nies. In turn, this wealth allowed the oligarchs to tighten their grip on the state institu-
tions and policies related to the energy sector.
State policy resulted in a monopolized system both with regard to imports and
domestic structures: Naftogaz of Ukraine was in fact created as a vertically integrated
oil and gas company engaged in the full cycle of operations in gas and oil ﬁeld explo-
ration and development, production and exploratory drilling, gas and oil transport and
storage, and supply of natural gas and LPG to consumers. Naftogaz, which itself is the
state-owned joint stock company subordinated to the Ministry of Fuel and Energy of
Ukraine, has been the sole owner of the natural gas transmission system operator, the
public joint stock company Ukrtransgaz (ECS Report 2014).
De facto, Naftogaz developed into a fronting institution controlled by and beneﬁting
the governing elites – it was set up to socialize the costs of energy and the privatization
of the rents.2 The beneﬁts accruing from the energy sector were enjoyed by a narrow
group of decision-makers within the executive branch, the Presidential Administration
and the Cabinet of Ministers, with no public scrutiny and accountability.
Owing to their high energy intensity, Ukrainian industries depended on low gas
prices to remain competitive – low prices came to be deﬁned as a vital national interest
of Ukraine. In many respects, keeping energy prices at a low level became a reform-
substitution strategy in Ukraine, while the energy sector as a whole played a pivotal part
in creating and sustaining the political system in post-Soviet Ukraine, which was
6 K. Wolczuk
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centered on state capture and rents (Balmaceda 2013). In this respect, the energy
dependence with Russia had a formative impact on the trajectory of post-Soviet Ukraine
because it shaped the very notion of national interest and the domestic structures and
policies.
Ukraine–EU relations and the energy sector reforms (1992–2004)
The system of (mis)management of energy interdependence had become entrenched
between 1992 and 2004. During this period, the EU was weakly engaged with Ukraine
in general and in reform of the energy sector in particular. The key bilateral document
governing cooperation between the EU and Ukraine in the energy sector was the Part-
nership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was in force between 1998 and
2014. It provided the general framework of EU–Ukraine energy cooperation but did not
include any speciﬁc commitments and schedule for their implementation. It merely
referred to the European Energy Charter of 1991 as the framework for cooperation of
the EU with third countries. One of the EU’s forms of engagement was via the INO-
GATE program, launched in late 1990s to promote regional integration of pipeline sys-
tems and to facilitate oil and gas transport within the post-Soviet states and onwards to
EU markets. Over the years, INOGATE’s scope was extended to include electricity,
renewable energy, and energy efﬁciency and to encourage private investment and sup-
port from international ﬁnancial institutions.
Nevertheless, interactions with the EU on energy-related issues through the PCA
institutional framework and INOGATE provided important insights into best practice in
the EU and its growing body of regulations. This knowledge generated strong demand
for reforms among state ofﬁcials, experts, and civil society (see Razumkov Centre 2001,
2012) as a means of ‘cleansing’ and modernizing the sector. Already in 2001 it was rec-
ognized that
Adaptation of Ukraine’s energy legislation to the norms and standards of the EU is intended
to: limit administrative interference of the state into the fuel and energy complex; liberalise
energy markets; create a favourable investment climate for attraction of foreign capital into
the fuel and energy complexes; raise energy efﬁciency of the economy; employ energy con-
servation potential; enhance nuclear safety; reduce negative environmental effects of the
fuel and energy complex; create strategic reserves of oil; and so on …. (2001, 58)
However, as the EU policy frameworks lacked powerful incentives and binding commit-
ments, they were unable to override elites’ vested interests within the energy sector.
While making pro-European declarations, the political elites in Ukraine acted as power-
ful gatekeepers, resisting inﬂuences that would jeopardize their particular political and
economic interests.
In 2003–2004, the EU launched its ﬂagship policy for the southern and eastern
neighbors – the ENP. At ﬁrst, the ENP hardly increased the EU’s inﬂuence, not least
because the EU even refrained from advocating speciﬁc regulatory templates in the early
stages of the policy. The key instruments were Action Plans, which subsequently were
re-named the Association Agendas. The 2005 Action Plan for Ukraine provided only a
vague and sketchy outline of expected alignment (Magen 2007; Wolczuk 2009).
Overall, the EU did not shape developments in the energy sector in Ukraine during
1992–2004 in any meaningful and tangible way. Clearly, by the time the EU started to
engage more closely with Ukraine in the mid-2000s, it came at a much later stage of
the post-communist transformation than in East-Central Europe. This time lag meant
Eurasian Geography and Economics 7
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that the vested interests were well consolidated, and corruption in the energy sector
came to underpin the whole post-Soviet political regime in Ukraine. Nevertheless,
through network governance and socialization, already at this stage the EU became rec-
ognized as the key source of reform templates among reform-oriented domestic actors.
The EU’s role grew further in prominence as Ukraine’s relations with Russia became
strained during 2005–2013.
Ukraine’s multi-vectored energy policy (2005–2013)
From 2005, energy prices began to rise and the contradictions within Ukraine’s energy
policy became more profound and exposed, as Russia sought to capitalize on the lever-
age that rising energy prices provided. The most glaring of these contradictions was
Ukraine’s explicit, far-reaching commitment to adopt EU rules to fence off Russian
demands, while failing to implement the necessary domestic reform, as will now be
explored.
Problems and tensions in Ukraine–Russia energy relations
Russia’s ‘petro-power’ and Ukraine
When Russian President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, energy prices were
on the rise. Mindful of the loss to the Russian economy from selling gas to former
Soviet republics at very low prices, Russia started to price its exports to the post-
Soviet countries at the European netback level (that is, equal to the price of Russian
gas in Europe, minus the additional transit cost). However, while important, money
was not the only motive: in practice, Russia’s policy remained guided by a complex
mix of commercial, geopolitical, and political motives, meaning that the implementa-
tion of this formula varied greatly across the post-Soviet space. While Russia raised
the prices for all post-Soviet states, it demanded higher prices and faster rises for the
states pursuing – what was perceived in Moscow – as unfriendly policy (Newnham
2011, 139).
Ukraine was among such states. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 trig-
gered fear in Russia of ‘democratic contagion’ to other republics, exacerbated by the
pro-western orientation of Ukraine’s new president, Viktor Yushchenko. In response, in
2005 Russia attempted to increase prices nearly ﬁvefold – from US$50/thousand cubic
meters (tcm) to US$235/tcm in 2005 (Pirani 2012, 176). Furthermore, Gazprom sud-
denly demanded full payment of Ukraine’s accumulated debt for gas supplies, which
Ukraine was simply unable to pay. This led to the ﬁrst ‘gas war’ in January 2006, when
Ukraine refused to agree to the price rise and Russia halted gas supplies to Ukraine,
which in turn limited supplies to countries in Europe. This shattered the long-held belief
in Ukraine that Russia would never sacriﬁce delivery to West European customers in
order to punish Ukraine. The ﬁrst ‘gas war’ ended with an agreement on US$100/tcm.
Yet, as an illustration of the clandestine nature of negotiations, intermediate companies
were brought in to broker the deal, such as RosUkrEnergo, controlled by Gazprom and
the Ukrainian oligarch, Dmytro Firtash, which resulted in signiﬁcant rent extraction and
what Balmaceda (2013, 21) calls ‘transborder sharing of rents’ with Russian elites.
While the prices started to rise, this deal dissuaded the Ukrainian ruling elites from
diversifying the supplies.
8 K. Wolczuk
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Gas supplies to Ukraine were subject to annual negotiations until 2009 when a sec-
ond gas war erupted owing to an inability to agree on terms. This longer crisis, which
caused considerable disruption of supply to Europe, resulted in new, worse terms for
Ukraine. The government of Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko demanded the
removal of the intermediary company. Yet, because the pricing formula linked gas prices
to oil prices, Ukraine ended up paying higher prices than many EU member states
(Matuszak 2011). The terms of the 2009 agreement reﬂected Ukraine’s weakened bar-
gaining power vis-à-vis Russia. The gas price became highly politicized domestically:
the highly unfavorable gas agreement was used by the Yanukovych regime in the trial
and subsequent of imprisonment of Yulia Tymoshenko in 2011.
Crucially, Russia sought to strengthen its position by reducing its reliance on
Ukraine as a key transit route to Europe. Despite a weak economic rationale, Moscow
sought alternative routes, including Nord Stream and the (now defunct) South Stream
pipelines, the combined capacity of which would exceed the Ukrainian Gas Transporta-
tion System (GTS)’s capacity. Russia’s leverage increased, making Ukraine even more
vulnerable.
In 2010, Russia agreed to a discount to secure a prolongation of the BSF base lease
in Crimea (see below). Furthermore, Russia offered to lower prices (from US$425 to
US$168/tcm) if Ukraine were to accede to the newly formed Eurasian Customs Union,
as well as cede control over the GTS to Gazprom (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2015). Yanu-
kovych refused the offer, as the GTS was one of the very few ‘aces up his sleeve,’
whereas Russia’s offer fell below Ukraine’s valuation.
Overall, in contrast to the EU, Russia favored a low degree of institutionalization; it
did not seek to introduce a codiﬁed corpus of rules nor seek to institutionalize negotia-
tions beyond the use of the intermediate trading companies, as stipulated in the 2006
contract (see earlier). This was despite the fact that Ukraine could hardly be regarded as
a reliable partner and was unable to service its chronic energy debt. There are at least
three reasons why the opaque, corrupt, and uncompetitive gas sector in Ukraine served
Russian interests. First, the (mis)management of the gas sector maintained Ukraine’s
‘addiction to Russian gas’; until 2013, Ukraine remained one of the largest importers of
Russia gas in the world. Secondly, this asymmetric interdependence offered Russia
opportunities to achieve broader geopolitical goals vis-à-vis Ukraine via issue linkage.
Third, gas trade with Ukraine provided opportunities for gas deals that generated rents
for the Russian elites, something which Russia’s gas exports to EU member states –
based on commercial principles – did not provide on the same scale.
Ukraine’s management of interdependence with Russia (2005–2013). Because of the all-
pervasive corruption in Ukraine, the promise to eliminate it, which was made during the
Orange Revolution, accounted for a signiﬁcant appeal of the new leadership. However,
the new Orange elites lacked a broader strategy to deal with gas interdependence and
prevailing inefﬁciencies at the very time when global energy prices were rising. Instead,
Tymoshenko fought to attenuate the inﬂuence of Dmytro Firtash, who beneﬁtted hand-
somely from the 2006 energy deal and enjoyed the backing of President Yushchenko.
The new leadership simply perpetuated the corrupt system of rents (Greene 2012) as
energy rents continued to underpin the political system during Yushchenko’s Presidency.
But while there was signiﬁcant resistance to economic reforms (Äslund 2009), gas
prices went up dramatically; the cost for Ukraine increased almost eightfold, namely
from US$50 in 2005 to US$425 in 2012. This became a formidable burden on the
Ukrainian economy and state budget, with Naftogaz debt to Gazprom accounting for
Eurasian Geography and Economics 9
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 08
:06
 24
 M
ay
 20
16
 
6–7 percent of the state budget in 2013 (Pirani 2014). Yet, despite the public ﬁnance
crisis, the Ukrainian elites were unwilling to raise domestic prices for gas, even though
this led to the failure of Ukraine to secure IMF ﬁnancial assistance in 2011 and 2013.
The longstanding pattern of (mis)management in the energy sector intensiﬁed with
the coming to power of Viktor Yanukovych in 2010. According to Äslund (2014), Presi-
dent Yanukovych extracted rents of approximately US$3 billion per year. Retaining low
energy prices for the population stemmed not only from the need for electoral support,
but it also left plenty of room for manipulation of the system so that it beneﬁted the rul-
ing elites. Against the backdrop of the 2008–2009 economic crisis, during which
Ukraine’s GDP shrunk by 15 percent in 2009, a gas price reduction was regarded as
pivotal to Ukraine’s economic recovery.
With the political regime and Ukraine’s overall economic performance dependent on
access to cheap energy resources, lowering the price of gas was the top priority for the
Yanukovych regime within which oligarchs played a prominent role (see Gnedina and
Sleptsova 2012). In pursuit of lower prices, Yanukovych sought to capitalize on
Ukraine’s geopolitical importance for Russia by making strategic concessions. He signed
the ‘Kharkiv Accords’ in April 2010, which extended the lease of the Sevastopol naval
base to the Russian Black Sea Fleet for 25 years (until 2042) for a 30 percent discount
in relation to the pricing formula agreed to in the 2009 contract. Symptomatically, once
again, as with previous bilateral state agreements, the ‘Kharkiv Accords’ provided an
unstable and contested legal framework lacking a reliable and transparent dispute resolu-
tion mechanism. Despite the ‘political discount,’ Ukraine still ended up paying more for
its imports than some EU countries, notwithstanding the lower transit costs (Pirani
2014). Russia linked further reductions to yet more geopolitical and economic conces-
sions, such as the ‘merger’ of Gazprom and Naftogaz, ceding control over the GTS and
joining the Eurasian Customs Union (Sherr 2010; Dragneva and Wolczuk 2015). This
issue linkage was ubiquitous in Russia’s policy in the ‘common neighborhood’: Russia
had been successful in obtaining similar concessions in Belarus and Armenia (see
Ademmer 2015; Fear 2013): both of them ceded control over GTS and joined the Rus-
sia-led Eurasian project.
In the Ukrainian case, however, Russian pressure started to have the opposite effect.
First, Ukraine’s resolve to retain the GTS stiffened, despite growing economic and
ﬁnancial difﬁculties faced by the Yanukovych regime. Second, Ukraine started buying
some gas on the spot market in Europe. Third, oligarchs began investing in energy
efﬁciency in their businesses (Matuszak 2012). Fourth, despite a concerted campaign,
the Ukrainian President refused to join the Eurasian regime (Dragneva and
Wolczuk 2015).
Overall, during 2005–2013 Ukrainian governing elites pursued a policy that was
bound to fail sooner or later: they sought low gas prices from Russia while resisting
Russia’s demands for ceding control over strategic assets and proposals for economic
re-integration. During this very period, Russia launched its new integration project,
the Eurasian Customs Union (2010), which evolved into the Eurasian Economic
Union by 2015, and Russia sought to secure Ukraine’s membership (Dragneva and
Wolczuk 2013). Ukraine’s resistance was motivated by concerns over an even deeper
dependence on Russia leading to a loss of Ukraine’s sovereignty but also a fear of a
loss of rents accruing from the control of the GTS. Unwilling to meet Russian
demands and/or embark on radical reforms of the energy sector, Ukrainian elites
turned to the EU.
10 K. Wolczuk
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The EU to the rescue? Ukraine–EU relations during 2005–2013
During 2005–2013, Ukraine’s engagement with the EU increased dramatically, although
this was limited to rule selection (the signing of various agreements) and selective and
incomplete rule adoption (the passing of laws), all of which amounted to a minimal,
token compliance with EU reform guidance.
EU’s export of the energy-related acquis
The EU is arguably the most extensively legalized international organization ever.
Adhering to the ‘regulatory state’ model, it relies on regulations rather than re-distribu-
tion and direct intervention in industry (Goldthau and Sitter 2014). The creation of the
single market for energy in the EU consisted of three main waves of legislation; the so-
called energy packages, aimed at liberalizing energy trade in the EU member states and
between them. A 1998 directive liberalized EU gas markets by promoting limited and
gradual market opening, including, for example, derogations over take-or-pay contracts.
The so-called Second Package of 2003 required that member states create an indepen-
dent regulatory body, regulate access tariffs, and provide non-discriminatory third-party
access through legal separation (‘unbundling’) of distribution from supplies. The Third
Package of 2009 focused on ownership unbundling, new regimes for independent sys-
tems/transmissions operators, and stronger national regulators.
Notwithstanding the extensive regulations, energy market heterogeneity has persisted
and indeed seems to be allowed under the Lisbon Treaty (Goldthau and Sitter 2014).
This has not deterred EU institutions from exporting the energy ‘rulebook’ (acquis com-
munautaire) beyond its borders on the European continent.3 The energy component of
the ENP and the Eastern Partnership, which was launched in 2009, exported rules as a
way to promote good governance to both energy-rich and energy-poor countries in its
eastern neighborhood, despite their divergent aspirations and prospects vis-à-vis the EU.
Ukraine was one of those countries interested in closer integration up to and including
membership (Wolczuk 2008).
With Ukraine, the ﬁrst important initiative was the bilateral Memorandum of Under-
standing on cooperation in the ﬁeld of energy (Memorandum of Understanding 2005),
which stipulated the ambition to upgrade cooperation in the ﬁeld of energy, aiming at
integration of Ukraine into the EU’s internal energy market. In the Memorandum,
Ukraine declared its readiness to implement key elements of the EU’s acquis on energy,
environment, competition, and renewable energy sources and agreed to join the newly
created Energy Community (see below). However, the Memorandum was a political
pledge rather than a binding legal framework and lacked tangible economic incentives.
As such, the Memorandum had little impact on domestic policy during Yushchenko’s
presidency (2005–2009).
The next signiﬁcant step was taken in 2009 when a Joint Declaration was adopted
at the Joint EU–Ukraine International Investment Conference on the Modernization of
Ukraine’s Gas Transit System, held in Brussels in March 2009. This was a joint initia-
tive of Ukraine, the EU, the World Bank, the European Bank of Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD), and the European Investment Bank (EIB) to assist Ukraine in
modernizing the GTS with agreed funding up to €2,650,000 Joint Declaration 2009).
Then the EU and Ukraine completed the ‘Preparatory studies for modernization of
Ukraine’s gas transit and storage’ in February 2011; that is, after Yanukovych’s acces-
sion to power (Duleba, Benč, and Bilčík 2012).4 Release of funding was, however,
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made conditional upon Ukraine’s progress in creating a domestic gas market in line with
EU requirements.
The conclusion of these steps seemingly indicated Ukraine’s readiness to adopt EU
rules. However, like the PCA and the ENP Action Plan, these documents were political
declarations – they lacked precision and a clear list of obligations, and with regard to
energy, contained just a list of pledges that were not legally binding or enforceable.
Also, the available incentives were weak, particularly compared to the high rents that
the elites could extract from the energy sector, as explained above.
Nevertheless, despite weak incentives, the Ukrainian elites proceeded to commit to
take on EU rules. The most signiﬁcant and extensive legal commitment resulted from
Ukraine’s accession to the treaty establishing the Energy Community, which was ratiﬁed
by Ukraine in 2010.5 Ukraine became a member in 2011, and this membership contin-
ues to deﬁne Ukraine’s obligations vis-à-vis the EU up to now.6
By joining the Energy Community Ukraine took on formal, extensive, and precise
legal commitments to align with the EU energy acquis. The accession protocol included
the energy acquis of the EU, which Ukraine has been obliged to harmonize with, as
well as the timeline for its implementation. In comparison to the ENP, the Energy Com-
munity represented a fundamental shift from low precision/high selectivity to high preci-
sion/low selectivity commitments in Ukraine’s relations with the EU. Ukraine nominally
committed itself to joining the single energy market, the pre-condition for which was a
fundamental reform of the energy sector. And yet, as will be discussed later, in practice
only very limited progress was made in terms of domestic reforms during 2010–2013.
Why did Ukraine take on extensive legal commitments vis-à-vis the EU without
enacting the necessary reforms? This puzzle is explained by Ukrainian leadership seek-
ing to preserve Ukraine’s near-monopolistic position as a transit country for Russian gas
and using EU-related legal commitments to counteract the pressure emanating from
Russia. They saw membership of the Energy Community as a means of securing the
EU’s support for Ukraine’s key transit role while at the same time preventing Russia
from taking over the GTS. Such a takeover would be in breach of the Third Package,
which restricted access to the market and investment in the EU energy infrastructure for
energy monopolies that fail to separate energy production, transmission, and supply.
Membership in the Energy Community was a legal mechanism to weaken Russian
leverage, something which had taken on a renewed impetus when Russia proposed ‘en-
hanced cooperation in the energy sector’ in the spring of 2010 (Sherr 2010). There were
reasons for Ukraine to worry about the growing asymmetry; Russia was increasingly
active in developing transit routes beyond Ukraine, as evidenced by the launch of the
Nord Stream and the plans for the South Stream.
Ukraine’s hopes of beneﬁting from membership in the Energy Community were
dashed on two accounts. First, the EU did not object to the proposed merger of Gaz-
prom and Naftogaz in the spring of 2010 and regarded it as a commercial deal, despite
obvious consequences for the strengthening of Gazprom’s monopolistic position in
Ukraine with regard to supplies and transportation, thereby contradicting the provisions
of the Third Energy package. After the Russian leadership tabled their proposals for the
acquisition of Naftogaz, the EU Energy Commissioner stated that a takeover of
Ukraine’s GTS would be a purely bilateral matter between Ukraine and Russia – even
though it would contradict EU’s policy toward Ukraine, as it would spell the end of the
adoption of EU rules on the gas market, including unbundling (Shapovalova 2010).
Although EU rules prevented Gazprom from strengthening its position on the EU
energy market through monopolistic arrangements, the EU had no corresponding qualms
12 K. Wolczuk
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in relation to Gazprom strengthening its position in Ukraine and other countries, such as
Moldova.7
Second, the EU’s endorsement of the construction of the Nord Stream pipeline
bypassing Ukraine and the prospects of building South Stream indicated a lack of
coherent strategy in the EU vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine. The EU and the Energy
Community were even reluctant to openly acknowledge, let alone counteract, the inﬂu-
ence of Russia in the neighboring countries dependent on Russian gas imports. This
was evident in countries where Gazprom exerted powerful leverage by acquiring con-
trolling stakes in the national gas transit systems, such as Armenia and Moldova
(Hunter, Lussac, and Wolczuk 2012).
Overall, the Energy Community was designed to promote transfer of the EU energy
acquis to non-member states in Europe; it was not about shaping broader EU energy
policy vis-a-vis the neighboring states. This resulted in ‘unrealistic expectations,’ in the
words of the Director General of the Energy Community (ECS Report 2014).8 In an
asymmetrical relationship, the neighboring countries agreed to adopt EU rules, but could
not rely on support from the EU institutions and member states when dealing with their
speciﬁc energy predicaments.
Ukraine’s alignment with EU’s gas market acquis (2010–2013)
Ukraine’s interest in using the EU to counterbalance Russia was evident in the limited
degree of domestic reforms. Ukraine made legal changes in order to join the Energy
Community. In particular, the law ‘On the Principles of the Functioning of Natural Gas
Market’ passed in July 2010 provided for gas market reform in line with the Second
Package of the EU. However, this was a very incomplete measure because the law did
not supersede previous Ukrainian legislative acts (such as the Law on Oil and Gas, the
Law on Pipeline Transport, the Gas Metering Law, the Law on State Regulation in
Energy, the Law on Natural Monopolies, and the Law on Licensing Economic Activi-
ties) and was contradicted by them. These laws often regulated the same issues and
impeded effective regulation (ECS Report 2014); moreover, no relevant secondary legal
acts were adopted.
Ukraine committed itself to implement the Second Package by 2012 and the Third
Package by 2015. After accession, Ukrainian authorities announced the restructuring of
Naftogaz in order to improve competition in the gas market and to meet the require-
ments of the Third Package of the EU. Yet in practice, only measures which coincided
with oligarchic preferences were adopted. This became apparent in April 2012, when
the Ukrainian parliament amended the law on pipeline transport, authorizing the govern-
ment to reorganize Naftogaz (Duleba, Benč, and Bilčík 2012). Under the bill, the
Ukrainian Government could restructure Naftogaz by merger, acquisition, demerger,
spin-off, or transfer. Nominally this law was adopted to fulﬁll Ukraine’s obligations
related to membership in the Energy Community, but in practice it was to facilitate oli-
garchic takeover of sections of the state monopoly. Naftogaz consisted of a number of
sub-companies, dealing with production, distribution, infrastructure, and so forth, which
were of interest to various oligarchic groups, but the actual restructuring of Naftogaz to
implement the unbundling principle was not undertaken by the Ukrainian authorities.
The energy acquis also prescribes the creation of an independent regulatory author-
ity by the member states of the Energy Community. Formally, Ukraine took some steps
toward establishing an independent regulatory authority in November 2011, when
President Yanukovych issued a decree creating the National Commission on the Energy
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Regulation of Ukraine (NERC), which became the single authority for regulating the
gas and electricity sector. However, this decree was not fully implemented. The NERC
remained dependent on government decisions on the tariff regulation of energy markets
and, hence, did not meet the requirements of the EU acquis (Duleba, Benč, and Bilčík
2012; Razumkov Centre 2012, 35). The NERC’s competences remained limited, and it
lacked a full range of regulatory powers foreseen under the Third Package, such as the
right to carry out investigations, impose measures to promote competition and proper
market functioning, and issue penalties to gas and electricity undertakings that did not
comply with their obligations (ECS Report 2014).
The supply-driven nature of the EU’s strategy accounts for its failure to factor in the
political and economic context of individual countries. The Energy Community’s de-
politicized, legalistic, and technocratic approach failed to take into account the highly
political nature of energy regimes in neighboring countries. Nominally technocratic solu-
tions advocated by the EU are highly consequential in distributive terms – adoption of
EU regulations on energy markets goes to the heart of the functioning of the political
regimes in the post-Soviet countries in the ‘common neighborhood.’ Therefore, the
Energy Community had little impact on domestic priorities and decision-making in
Ukraine.
The Ukrainian Government failed to establish an independent energy regulatory
authority, which was the key provision for the gradual liberalization of the gas market,
including the unbundling of the energy monopolies (DIXI Group 2014). The lack of
these reforms, in turn, meant that the EU was unable to release necessary funding for
the much-needed modernization of the GTS. As a consequence, Ukraine’s position as a
transit country was further weakened.
The end of ‘the Balancing Act’ between Russia and the EU
Overall, between 2005 and 2013, Ukraine’s management of its energy interdependence
was contradictory. As far as Russia was concerned, Ukraine demanded low gas prices
but resisted Russian plans for re-integration within the Eurasian project or ceding con-
trol of its strategic assets. With regard to the EU, Ukraine wanted to beneﬁt from its
support, but failed to enact the reforms that would facilitate this support. Both in rela-
tion to Russia and the EU, Ukraine sought to derive beneﬁts without making reciprocal
commitments. For the incumbent elites, integration with the EU was meant to enhance
Ukraine’s energy security in relation to Russia, especially through the discontinuation of
the South Stream project and eliminating the possibility that Russia would gain control
over Ukraine’s energy infrastructure. Quite simply, the governing elites hoped to achieve
these beneﬁts without dismantling the well-entrenched domestic ‘structures operating
under the guise of state interests’ (Razumkov Centre 2012, 33). It was noted that,
[T]he weaker Ukraine internally, the stronger the Russian factor – in internal affairs as well
as international relations. For this reason, internal incapacity and external dependence have
operated like the blades of a scissor, opening or closing in tandem. (Sherr 2006, 11)
This became only too evident in 2013, when Ukraine was sliding into recession and
high gas prices crippled its unstructured economy.
In Hirschman’s (1980, 27) words, ‘harassed statesmen generally have a short-run
view.’ With Ukraine on the brink of recession, the political survival of the incumbent
elites in Ukraine made them put a premium on a deal with Russia to secure a ﬁnancial
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bailout and to lower the energy price. The strategic concession that Ukraine offered on
this occasion was suspending signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, which
had been ready for signing since late 2011 (though the EU refused to sign it because of
concerns over selective justice in Ukraine, namely the imprisonment of Yulia
Tymoshenko). The ad hoc, secretive deal between Putin and Yanukovych in November
2013 was to bolster the latter’s standing in preparation for the presidential elections of
2015, despite his dismal track record and low public support. In exchange for suspend-
ing the signing of the Association Agreement, Yanukovych obtained from Russia a
$US15 billion ﬁnancial loan and a gas price lowered to US$268/tcm, albeit temporarily
(to be reviewed quarterly). Ofﬁcially, Yanukovych did not agree to join the Eurasian
bloc nor, more speciﬁcally, to suspend membership in the Energy Community. However,
the decision amounted to a major integration U-turn by the Ukrainian leadership, which
would further erode the already limited inﬂuence of the EU (Dragneva and Wolczuk
2015).
Ukraine since 2014: away from Russia, toward the EU?
As is well known, the decision to postpone the signing of the Association Agreement
triggered mass protests in Ukraine, culminating in the ousting of President Yanukovych
in early 2014 and the formation a new government in Ukraine followed by presidential
and parliamentary elections in 2014. Having realized that economic and energy depen-
dence was not enough to inﬂuence Ukraine’s domestic and foreign policy, Russia shifted
to coercive measures. Following the annexation of Crimea, Russia engaged in hybrid
warfare in Eastern Ukraine (Freedman 2014). In parallel with violating Ukraine’s territo-
rial integrity, Russia has applied a number of trade restrictions, resulting in a threefold
decline of Ukraine’s exports to Russia. From January 2016, Russia unilaterally excluded
Ukraine from the 2011 CIS FTA, something which, inevitably, further reduces Ukraine’s
trade with Russia, forcing a radical re-orientation toward the EU and third markets.
Energy has been a ‘third front line’ between Ukraine and Russia. The new Ukrai-
nian Government, mindful of the unsatisfactory 2009 gas contract, objected to the pric-
ing formula and sought to renegotiate the 2009 gas contract. Not only did Russia refuse
– it actually canceled the discount that Ukraine had received in 2010 as a result of the
‘Kharkiv Accords’ on the basis that Crimea’s ‘reuniﬁcation’ with Russia meant that
Moscow was no longer required to pay for the lease for the military base for the station-
ing of the BSF. As negotiations on gas prices broke down, Russia halted gas supplies in
June 2014, and Ukraine relied on limited domestic extraction and reverse ﬂows of
cheaper Russian gas from Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia. Thanks to EU mediation, a
short-term compromise was worked out and the so-called ‘winter and summer packages’
agreed in the autumn of 2014 and in the spring of 2015. Nevertheless, once again, in
the summer of 2015, Ukraine and Russia failed to agree on a new gas price on the basis
of the disputed 2009 contract. Russia suspended supplies to Ukraine in June 2015, while
both Gazprom and Naftgaz engaged in litigation against each other. For the ﬁrst time in
its post-Soviet history, Ukraine did not import any gas from Russia and, as Prime Min-
ister Yatseniuk proudly stated, ‘survived the winter of 2015–2016 without a cubic meter
of Russian gas’ (BBC Ukraina 2016).
Upon coming to power in 2014, the new authorities came to regard Ukraine’s
dependence on Russian energy as a major strategic threat and sought to rapidly diversify
its supplies. Ukraine was able to source gas from Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia (in the
case of the latter by a new inter-connector pipeline opened in the spring 2015). New
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gas contracts with European gas companies have been transparent, vastly reducing the
scope of rent-extraction in comparison to the pre-2014 period. In total, Ukraine almost
halved its gas imports from Russia to a record low of 14.5 billion cubic meters of gas
in 2014 (Varfolomeyev 2015), something which also reﬂected the decline in energy
consumption stemming from a profound economic crisis in Ukraine. At the same time,
considerable international assistance has been focussed on promoting energy efﬁciency.
Thus, what post-Soviet Ukraine had not achieved after 20 years of existence, became
possible within 18 months. Nevertheless, in the short- to medium-term, Ukraine will
have to rely on some energy imports from Russia, but, given the considerable potential
for energy savings and reverse ﬂows of Russian gas from the EU, Ukraine’s overwhelm-
ing dependence on Russian energy has declined dramatically, together with the inﬂuence
that this rendered.
The conﬂict with Russia made Ukraine more dependent on support from the EU,
resulting in the acceleration of the adoption of EU rules. In May 2015, the Ukrainian
parliament passed a ‘Law on the Gas Market,’ one of the most signiﬁcant reform mea-
sures adopted by the new government and a key precondition of IMF ﬁnancial assis-
tance to Ukraine. The law, which was drafted in cooperation with the Secretariat of the
Energy Community, came into force in October 2015 and provides for full alignment
with the Third Package, creating a basis for a competitive gas market in Ukraine. The
new law deprives Naftogaz of its monopolistic status and forces a break-up of the com-
pany but also strikes at the interest of one of the most powerful oligarchs in Ukraine,
Dmytro Firtash, who controls 80 percent of regional gas distribution companies in
Ukraine. Despite being under indictment (2014–2015) and remaining in exile (as of
early 2016), Firtash has retained his de facto monopolistic position with regard to gas
market in Ukraine and has used his political inﬂuence to derail the reforms of the gas
sector in Ukraine, when they threaten his position and interests.
The law relies on a number of other detailed legal measures and executive decisions.
One of them relates to the creation of the independent energy regulator. The NERC,
which never assumed such a role, is to be replaced by a new body, the National Com-
mittee on State Regulation of Energy and Utilities (NKREP), with a much broader
scope of competences in line with the EU’s Directive 2009/72/EC (Końonczuk 2015).
Further laws have been passed promoting enforcement and transparency in the gas sec-
tor. Crucially, the price for households and public sector consumers has been raised and
is to increase by 300 percent by 2017.
Given the centrality of the gas sector for the political system, its reform is at the heart
of domestic reform in Ukraine. However, rapid implementation of gas market reforms is
unlikely. The 2015 Law is just a ﬁrst of a series of long and challenging reform measures.
The regulatory templates promoted by the EU do not lend themselves to fast and easy
implementation. This is because the EU’s approach has been supply-driven in the sense
that it exports regulatory templates already developed within the EU; it is not a problem-
solving measure for a crisis-stricken country with limited capacity and resources, on the
one hand, and, powerful vested interests, on the other. As Magen (2007, 366) noted, ‘the
complex, detailed and dynamic nature of regulatory framework raises both substantive
and procedural difﬁculties for any third country intended on full or partial alignment with
the acquis.’ Restructuring the energy sector is a particularly demanding process requiring
an overhaul of the whole regulatory framework, de-monopolization, and fundamental
reorganization of how the infrastructure is managed. While various kinds of reform mea-
sures have been taken since 2014, it is evident that so far the authorities lack an overarch-
ing and coherent vision for the reform of the gas market.
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Conclusions
The EU and Russia have been pursuing opposite objectives in Ukraine and have used
different instruments to achieve them. In legal terms, Ukraine–Russia energy relations
lacked a stable and functioning legal framework resulting in negotiations conducted on
an ad hoc basis in a highly politicized, non-transparent way. This approach worked to
Russia’s advantage in particular by providing tailored (dis)incentives for the Ukrainian
elites. With the gas trade generating massive opportunities to the ruling elites in Ukraine
to seek personal enrichment, Russia could simply rely on the vested interests inside
Ukraine to preserve Ukraine’s monopolized, inefﬁcient, and opaque gas sector in its
unreformed state (Razumkov Centre 2012, 35). This is very much in line with Hirsch-
man’s conceptual framework, as the difﬁculty for Ukraine of dispensing with energy
dependence with Russia was aggravated by ‘the strength of the vested interests which A
has created by its trade economics of B’ (1980, 18).
Hirschman (1980) argues that economic asymmetry confers power on the dominant
partner, which can inﬂuence developments in the smaller state. Certainly, this was true
in Russia’s policy toward Ukraine until 2014. Up until that point, Russia was able to
use its economic muscle to threaten Ukraine by stopping gas supplies, ‘because an inter-
ruption of the relationship would cause much greater distress in B than in A’ (Abdelal
and Kirshner 1999, 120). Ukraine’s salvation lay in its position as a transit country,
meaning that Russia could only use this strategy intermittently, and even then only for
very short spells. Nevertheless, being a smaller country, Ukraine carried the bulk of the
risks and costs of the deterioration in relations, especially with Russia investing in alter-
native transit routes. Yet paradoxically, despite Russia’s superior power in the relation-
ship, the ineffectiveness of Moscow’s policy of offering subsidized gas to neighboring
states to shape their domestic and foreign policies would suggest that this was not a
viable long-term option (Closson 2011; Drezner 1999). Russia was unable to secure the
concessions it sought; indeed, its actions have had the opposite effect.
Therefore, asymmetric interdependence by itself cannot explain bargaining outcomes
between more powerful and weaker states (Keohane and Nye 2000, 21). After two dec-
ades of failing to achieve its strategic objectives vis-à-vis Ukraine, Russia’s shifted to
coercion against Ukraine in 2014 to achieve them (Dragneva and Wolczuk 2015). As
Keohane and Nye (2000, 24) argue ‘employing force on one issue against an indepen-
dent state with which one has a variety of relationships is likely to rupture mutually
proﬁtable relations on other issues.’ Against the backdrop of military aggression,
Ukraine has been prepared to incur whatever costs were necessary – even curtailing its
trade and energy relationship with Russia – in order to preserve its sovereignty. In other
words, the use of force disrupted complex and longstanding patterns of interdependence.
In broader terms, the analysis of Ukraine–Russia energy relations clearly indicates that
economic interdependence per se does not create ‘a new brave world of cooperation’
that replaces ‘the bad old world of international conﬂict’ (Keohane and Nye 2000, 9).
In comparison to Russia, for a long time the EU was much less effective in shaping
domestic developments in Ukraine. The EU’s late arrival on the scene and overall
endeavors to inﬂuence Ukraine by exporting a ‘regulatory state’ model in a depoliti-
cized, rule-oriented, technocratic approach account for EU’s limited inﬂuence. The scale
of rents that elites were able to extract from the energy sector dwarfed the amount of
ﬁnancial support offered by the EU. And yet the EU expected the Ukrainian elites to do
what was good for the country and dismantle the system that had been beneﬁting the
same elites, thereby ignoring the political economy of post-Soviet Ukraine (Dragneva
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and Wolczuk 2012a). Ukrainian elites were formally open to the ﬂow of rules as
evidenced by a number of agreements between the EU and Ukraine. But, in practice,
the pre-existing deep-seated interests of Ukrainian elites perpetuated the opaque gas
trading system, resulting in them being very selective about the rules that they were
prepared to adopt.
Since 2014, Russia’s coercive actions deepened Ukraine’s asymmetric interdepen-
dence with the EU, which in turn made its support conditional on domestic reforms,
including in the energy sector. However, this turn westward does not mean that there
will be rapid and smooth alignment with EU rules. Only gradual reforms of the gas
market have been embarked upon (as already evidenced by the slow adoption and
implementation of the new law on the gas market in 2015). Even for neighboring coun-
tries most oriented toward the EU, energy is a particularly challenging sector for the
transfer of EU rules. EU policy is supply-driven and hence rather ill-suited to the condi-
tions of countries, such as Ukraine. Still, following the footsteps of the three Baltic
states, Ukraine is set on limiting its interdependence with Russia and, thereby, ending
its corrosive impact on domestic developments. Reforming the energy sector will be a
long-term challenge and thus it remains to be seen whether Ukraine will be the ﬁrst
country in the ‘common neighborhood’ to break the vicious circle of energy depen-
dence, inefﬁciency and corruption.
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Notes
1. The EU rules, which promote energy efﬁciency, investment in renewable sources of energy,
and the creation of the energy market, curb power of energy monopolies. A competitive
energy sector attracts investment and promotes diversiﬁcation of contracts and supplies.
2. I am grateful for Margarita Balmaceda for making this point.
3. The acquis communautaire is the body of law and obligations of EU accumulated since 1958
to the present day. It comprises all the EU’s treaties and laws (directives, regulations, deci-
sions), declarations and resolutions, international agreements, and the judgments of the Court
of Justice as well as action that EU member states take together in areas such as the Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).
4. Also, the feasibility study and environmental and social impact assessments of the moderniza-
tion of the Ukrainian GTS system and underground storage were funded by the EU in the
framework of the Neighborhood Investment Facility to prepare the ground for investments by
international ﬁnancial institutions in the GTS.
5. The Energy Community was set up to promote compliance with the EU’s complex and
detailed regulatory templates for the creation of energy markets in non-member states. The
Energy Community is an international organization containing the EU (represented by the
European Commission) and several Balkans countries (and eastern neighbors). As of June
2015, the members included Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Kosovo, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine. Norway, Turkey, and
Armenia have observer status in the organization, whereas Georgia has applied to join. The
Energy Community aims to extend the EU’s internal energy market to southeastern Europe)
and the Black Sea region. Its activities, which related to gas, electricity, security of supply,
18 K. Wolczuk
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 B
irm
ing
ha
m]
 at
 08
:06
 24
 M
ay
 20
16
 
renewable energy, oil, energy efﬁciency, environment, and competition, are mainly ﬁnanced
by the EU budget. The Energy Community Treaty was signed in 2006 for the initial period
of 10 years, after which it can be extended by the consent of the participating parties. Ukraine
signed the Protocol concerning accession to the Energy Community in September 2010 and
became its full-ﬂedged member in February 2011.
6. With regard to the energy sector, membership in the Energy Community is the most important
commitment to align with EU rules. The coveted Association Agreement merely re-asserts the
obligations related to the membership (Title V, Chapter 1, on ‘Energy Cooperation, including
Nuclear Issues’).
7. The example of Moldova was instructive: Gazprom gained 50 percent ownership of the
Moldovan transit pipelines and then Russia demanded the suspension of Moldova’s Third
Energy package commitments as an explicit condition for lowering gas prices. In 2012,
Moldova succumbed to Russian demands for the derogation of its commitments within the
Energy Community till 2020.
8. Secretary General of the Energy Community, Janez Kopac at https://www.energy-community.
org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME/NEWS/News_Details?p_new_id=7101
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